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The system of compensation for occupational diseases is a
corollary to that of workmen's compensation for accident, for
the basis of the two is a common one. For a liability based on
fault there is substituted by the compensation system a burden
on industrT which eventually shifts itself upon the consumer.
The underlying theory is simple. It treats the wastage of
man-power as it does the wearing out of machinery-as an
inevitable incident of industry, to be borne in the first instance
by industry.' It recognizes that it is humanly impossible to
entirely avoid accident, and that the required standard of care
of a reasonably careful man is really a counsel of perfection,
calling for a degree of virtue to which none can fully attain.
Generally speaking, the compensation acts know no distinction
between careless and careful.2 If it were possible to encourage
care and discourage negligence by such a differentiation, the
attempt to do so would lead into many of the very difficulties
which the compensation system seeks to avoid, for one of the
great incidental advantages is that it does away with much of
the uncertainty and expense of litigation.
Compensation acts of the involuntary type, as well as those
styled voluntary, are now upheld with practical unanimity of
judicial opinion. The volition, however, on the part of the em-
ployer in even the voluntary act is of a very limited character,
consisting as it does of a right of choice between a new system
and an old system shorn of important protections and benefits
to the employer.
The pressure to adopt the new system generally assumes the
form of a statutory provision taking away from the non-con-
senting employer his so-called common law defenses of con-
tributol negligence, negligence of fellow servant and assump-
tion of risk.
The compensation system has now proven itself, and its bene-
ficial effect upon those directly concerned and upon society as
I"The plain purpose of the compensation law is to make the risk of
the accident one of the industry itself, to follow from the fact of the
injury, and hence that compensation on account thereof should be treated
as an element in the cost of production, added to the cost of the article
and borne by the community in general2 1 SCHNEIER, WOnKMEN.'S CO!-
PENSATION LAW (1922) § 1, p. 2.




a whole is no longer a matter of theory. Employers and em-
ploye4 with hardly a dissenting note now unite in its praise.
This attitude is, however, the result of a gradual change of
opinion on the part of several influential elements of society.
Employers looked with apprehension upon a system which in
effect furnished a form of insurance, and the idea that there
could be liability except when based upon fault was a new one
to the bar, traditionally a conservative element. But, somehow,
that which was feared by the employers did not seem to hap-
pen, and the bar gradually adjusted itself to a new series of
legal concepts. The same conservatism has manifested itself
in the case of every enlargement of the scope of the compensa-
tion principle. It has been said that there was no stopping
place between compensation for occupational diseases and com-
plete health insurance. That one tends to run unto the other
can not be denied, and yet experience has shown that there is
a real line of demarcation.
Were it not for two considerations a theoretically sound system
of compensation would give a full wage for the whole period
of total incapacity, a full equivalent for the time lost through
partial incapacity, medical attendance as long as needed and
an amount in case of death which, figured on actuarial prin-
ciples, would place the family in the same position financially
as though the death had not occurred. Here, as throughout
the whole law, the objective is a complete equivalent. In com-
pensation, as in the determination of ordinary legal rights, the
full attainment of this ideal is impossible. In fixing compensa-
tion, concessions must be made both to the shortcomings of
human nature and to practical exigencies which exist because
of the fact that social legislation of this character is slow in
getting a foothold, representing as it does a new series of con-
ceptions and placing a burden which may not readily distribute
itself among those who should bear it in the end.
We have, therefore, a system of compensation which grants
to the injured workman a percentage of his loss, leaving a part
to fall upon him as a spur and incentive to effort, a rough attempt
to determine one's loss through the deprivation of a member or
an interference with a function, the giving of medical services
for a period often shortened arbitrarily and an allowance in case
of death which is generally limited to a time much less than
the workman would probably have lived had it not been for-
the accident or disease.
Sporadic efforts have been made to get at more exact re-
sults. In California,3 for instance, the attempt is made to dif-
3 The general spirit of the system illustrated by the California legisla-
tion appears in the discussions of the report of the Committee on Statistics
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ferentiate between the effect of a certain injury upon one of
a certain employment and its effect upon one of a different
employment, for it is obvious that a finger may have a greater
money value to a violinist than to one who works with his
brain only or does rough work with his hands. The relation
which the dependents bear to the deceased workman is an ele-
ment often taken into account.4 These variations from the
more common fixed type are obviously in the right direction,
but are subject to important limitations. It is more important
that the law should be clear, simple, easily understood and
practically workable than that it should be theoretically perfect.
There is no sound difference in principle between an incap-
acity or a death caused by a disease which has its roots in
occupation and one resulting from accident in the usual sense
of the term. As said in the best known American work on the
subject of workmen's compensation :5
"The distinction which is drawm in nearly all the acts between
'accidental' injuries and 'occupational diseases' is extremely un-just and illogical. The principal argument in favor of the work-
men's compensation acts, heard on all hands, is that each in-
dustry should care for the human wrecks which it creates. The
man who breathes lead fumes and contracts plumbism, or in-
hales marble or other dust from the air in the shop where he
is working and is totally incapacitated from pneumoconiosis, is
to a very much greater extent, the victim of the industry in
which he is engaged, than is the workman who falls downstairs
in going from one floor to another in the shop and breaks both
legs. The dependents of a workman who for months or pos-
sibly years lingers in a helpless condition from an occupational
disease, and then dies, are infinitely worse off, as a rule, than
are the widows and children of workmen who are taken away
suddenly by an 'accidental' injury."
In the discussions of the International Association of Commis-
sioners, made up of the commissioners and others concerned
in the administration of compensation acts or especially inter-
ested in the subject, an association which has done much to
perfect the law on the subject and to standardize administra-
tion, much used to be heard of the dramatic incident attendant
upon accident. That dramatic incident is, however, in many
accidents utterly lacking. The strain, for instance, may have
been unrecognized, and in many a doubtful case its very ex-
istence is determined only by reasoning back from subsequent
and Compensation Insurance of the International Association of Commis-
sions, printed in BULLETN OF THEI UNrrED STATES BUMW OF LABoa
STA-TISTICS No. 333 (1923) 72 et seq., under the head of "Standard Per-
manent Disability Schedule."
4 As in New York.
BRA-DBURY, WORKIEN'S COMPENSATION (3d ed. 1917) 7.
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conditions. When the subject is pursued we reach a point
where it is hard to differentiate between an accident in the
ordinary sense and an exposure which causes disease.
There are, however, certain differences between accident and
disease which must be reckoned with in the attempt to extend
the system of compensation to occupational disease. Speaking
generally, an accident arrests the attention and makes an obvious
appeal; the disease usually creeps on slowly, and may be rec-
ognized only when it has fully developed. There may be two
similar employments, one apparently innocuous, the other at-
tended with conditions which seem to be freighted with danger.
The former in point of fact may be slowly killing the work-
man, while the latter may be simply making him uncomfort-
able. Perhaps no better illustration of this can be given than
in dusty employments. The man who works among apparently
clean surroundings upon one kind of stone may be fast develop-
ing a pneumoconiosis, while one who is shoveling coal or ashes
may become covered with dirt but really suffer no harm.
Other points of difference will appear as we proceed. The
problem of the two kinds of compensation being really one,
there is obviously a distinct advance in the recognition of the
duty owed to the employee when the law passes from a con-
dition which takes account of accident only to a state where
compensation is made also for occupational disease.'
All systems of compensation, whether for accident or occupa-
tional disease, are the creatures of statute. These statutes have
grown out of the recognition of social needs. They are shaped
in a peculiar sense by the industrial conditions in the jurisdic-
tions in which they are passed. While there has been legislative
borrowing, the statutes borrowed from other jurisdictions have
been so changed to meet local requirements that there is a wide
variation. The plan of compensation of each jurisdiction is
hence definitely a system in itself. Any general principle is
apt to be inapplicable at any one point.
The individual character of the legislation on workmen's com-
pensation for accident and- occupational disease is in no way
better illustrated than in the experience with those subjects of
the National Conference on Uniform State Laws.8  This com-
6 There exists a considerable body of literature, largely in the form of
pamphlets and reports, upon the relative effects of exposures to dust from
quartz and marble and other stone and metallic substances. Generally
speaking, in the administration of the acts the facts have to be developed
as in a court proceeding by expert evidence.
It has been said that "no law in its original enactment made specific
provision for compensating occupational diseases." BULLETIN OF THE
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS No. 379 (1925) (by Lindley
D. Clark).
89 U. L. A. (1923) 233, 299.
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mission, after years of study, and after hearing the expression
of views from all parts of the country, prepared drafts which
were recommended for adoption. These drafts met with no
criticism, but nevertheless failed of passage practically every-
where. The obvious reason for this was that legislation of a
general character did not seem to fit the varying needs and
desires of different jurisdictions.
Fortunately, we have in convenient form, and brought practi-
cally down to the minute, indexes to such legislation by means of
which the terms of the statutory law throughout the jurisdic-
tions can be ascertained9 This is, however, no easy task, as
in a new and living subject amendments have followed fast on
the heels of legislation. For our present purpose, we need
to deal with this statutory material only in the most general
way for purposes of illustration and comparison.
THE WAYS IN WHICH OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES BECOME
COMPENSABLE; THREE LINES OF THOUGHT
There are three different ways in which in different juris-
dictions occupational diseases become compensable;
First-They are sometimes included by implication under the
general terms of the workmen's compensation act.
Secand-They are made compensable generally by apt lan-
guage providing that compensation is to be made for all oc-
cupational diseases, with perhaps specific exceptions.
Third--A schedule of diseases is given, and a right of com-
pensation is created for diseases named in such schedule.
Occupational Diseases Under the General Claduses of the Work-
men's Compensmation Act. Generally, occupational diseases do
not fall within the general terms of the compensation acts as
they are construed by the courts. The idea of compensation
for accident took root much earlier than did that of compensa-
tion for disease. There is frequently in legislation no direct
reference to disease, and in the discussions which have preceded
the original legislation of the several states there has seldom
been any consideration of the subject of occupational disease.
9 One is the Digest (10th ed.) prepared by Professor F. Robertson Jones
under the auspices of the Workmen's Compensation Publicity Bureau, and
the other the Digest prepared under the direction of the National Bureau
of Casualty and Surety Underwriters. In addition to these, Bulletin 423
of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, entitled WonrbtEN's
COIPENSATION LEGISLATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA AS OF JULY
1, 1926, reprints the statutory provisions up to that date. The various
points made throughout this article will find ready illustration in the
tabulations of these two Digests and in the specific language of the
statutes set out in the reprints in the government publication.
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The acts have come before the courts for construction, there-
fore, with apparently little to indicate legislative intent. Where
the word accident has been used, as in the British Act,10 to
which our own system goes back immediately, the employment
of the term has often been regarded as an indication that disease
was not included in the compensation system. The silence upon
this specific point in legislative acts and in discussion aiding in
the determination of legislative intent has been construed at
times as indicating that the legislature was dealing exclusively
with what was regarded as the main feature of the subject, ac-
cident. Some of the acts have set the question at rest by a
positive provision that diseases other than those which resulted
from a definite trauma were excluded."
In two adjoining New England states having in general much
the same system of jurisprudence, the question was open so far
as any very clear indications of intent were concerned. The
courts of the two states reached diametrically opposite results.
In Massachusetts the question came before the Supreme Judi-
cial Court in 1914 in Hurle's Case. 2  The workman there suf-
fered from an acute attack of optic neuritis induced by poisonous
coal tar gases. He had worked about furnaces for producing
gas by the burning of coal, in the top of which were several
holes through which, after opening a cover, he could watch the
fire. It was necessary, in the performance of his duty, for him
to open the holes many times a day and whenever they were
opened poisonous gases issued. The inhalation of these gases
caused blindness. The court, through Chief Justice Rugg, con-
siders the case as presenting a situation where particles were
thrown in much the same way as pieces of coal might have
been thrown and holds that there had been a "personal injury."
The court regards the size of the object and the way in which
it does its work as immaterial. It emphasizes the fact that the
lo The British Act of 1906 is easily accessible, not only in its original
form, but in the reprint in 2 BRADBURY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
(2d ed. 1914) 1735 et seq. Occupational diseases came into the British
system b" an act of Parliament subsequent to the original legislation.
The statutes up to 1925 are collected in ELLIOTT, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION AcT (8th ed. 1925).
11 As in Iowa, where the statute reads, "The words 'injury' or 'personal
injury' shall be construed as follows: . . . . They shall not include a
disease unless it shall result from the injury."
12 217 Mass. 233, 226, 227, 104 N. E. 336, 338-339 (1914). It is there
said, "if the gas had exploded within the furnace and thrown pieces of
'cherry' hot coal through the holes into the workman's eyes, without
question he would have been entitled to compensation . . . . There ap-
pears to be no sound distinction in principle between such case and gas
escaping through the holes and striking him in the face whereby through
inhalation the vision is destroyed."
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Massachusetts Act, differing from the British Act and those
of many states, omits the word accident.
In Johnsow's Case,3a decided a few months later, the malady
was lead poisoning, a definitely occupational disease. The em-
ployee had for twenty years been absorbing lead poison. The
award of compensation was sustained. Perhaps it may be said,
therefore, that according to the Massachusetts theory the disease
is really the consequence of a trauma, but that instead of one
blow with a definite result the trauma is made up of an almost
infinite number of incidents which, each in itself unimportant,
are serious when preceded or followed by others. Obviously,
this view extends to diseases generally, assuming only that we
have the untoward condition growing out of industry, and the
causal relation between that condition and the disease. The
Massachusetts cases are thus typical of one view to be taken
of the problem. The word injury is taken to comprehend not
only a single definite trauma producing a marked result, but a
series of invasions, insignificant taken individually, but when
combined capable of producing incapacity or death.
In Connecticut, the statute as it stood early in 1915 14 bore a
strong family resemblance to the Massachusetts Act. The word
accident occurred in but one place,' which was in connection
with reports and where its inclusion might well have been ex-
plained, as it was explained in the dissenting opinion in the
case to which reference is about to be made, as resulting from
inadvertence.
The act had much in the way of legislative history to affect
its interpretation, however. A commission, for instance, had
been appointed, which had made a report, and there were legisla-
tive debates, the record of which had been preserved. The
act of that state, like that of any other, had of course to be
construed as a whole. A case involving ten dollars in money,
but a great deal in point of principle, arose in the administra-
tion of the act, and compensation was awarded for lead poison-
ing. In due course of time it reached the Supreme Court of
Errors and was made the subject of one of the leading com-
pensation cases of the state, and in fact of the country.", The
conclusion of the court was diametrically opposite from that
which had been reached in Massachusetts, and it was held that,
in order that compensation be granted, there must be some-
thing different from a series of exposures each harmless in
13 217 Mass. 388, 104 N. E. 735 (1914).
:" Conn. Pub. Acts 1913, c. 133, pt. B.
'1 Ibid. §20.
'sMiller v. American Steel and Wire Co., 90 Conn. 349, 97 Atl. 345
(1916).
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itself. There must be a definite event attributable to time and
place.
This case furnished the text and the starting point for
legislation which has occupied the attention of the General As-
sembly of Connecticut for nearly every session since then. The
necessity for the existence of an incident attributable to time
and place was removed by legislative enactment," and it was
said that the word injury should be construed to include a
disease, if not communicable, which was due to causes peculiar
to the occupation. There was added to the definition clause
of the statute a provision that the word injury should include
occupational diseases.
The construction of the Connecticut act is an interesting story,
but aside from our present object. It has presented a picture
of decision construing statute, statute changing the result of
decision and decision again construing the statute working the
change. In the process the distinctions necessarily became finer
and finer. Before the sitting of the General Assembly of 1927
it was believed that the different interests-those of the em-
ployers, insurers and employes, as well as the public itself-
would present their differences with results that it would be
difficult to prophesy. The matter took such form, however, that
there was no contest before the legislature, and legislation was
passed which made rather sweeping changes in the subject of
compensation for occupational diseases. The effect, and even
the construction of that legislation are for the future. While
the underlying principles remain, the general tendency of the
Connecticut legislation is to narrow the scope of the compen-
sation in such cases.
Diseases in General Made Compensable by Express Language.
The instances are rare where by express language the compen-
sation system is extended to cover diseases in the same broad and
general way that it covers accident. One of the exceptional il-
lustrations is found in Connecticut in the legislation following
the Miller case to which reference has just been made.. The
reason for this is obvious. There is such difficulty and un-
certainty in tracing causal connection between the hazards of
work and disease that the states have hesitated to carry the
compensation principle to its logical conclusion.
Compensation for Scheduled Diseases. There are certain
diseases which are practically restricted to industry and where
the causal connection is not difficult to establish. What may be,
therefore, still called the typical form of act for the compensa-
tion of occupational diseases confines its operation to a few
diseases of this character, stating in general terms that com-
1 Conn. Pub. Acts 1919, c. 142, §§ 1, 18.
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pensation shall be awarded for such diseases as are included
in a schedule, in one form or another made a part of the act2 8
In this respect the British Act has been often taken as a model.
It is in effect a supplement to the original British Act providing
compensation, and gives a similar form of relief in case of
occupational disease.
In this form of legislation logic is frankly left behind and,
by the adoption of a schedule which must necessarily be artificial,
it is sought to secure practical results in the form of compensa-
tion in a large percentage of cases where compensation should
be granted. There are necessarily many gaps, and many meri-
torious cases must go without relief. On the other hand, it
eliminates much guess-work, and avoids a great deal of danger
which would otherwise exist of compelling industry to pay for
that for which it is not responsible.
The mention of this form of statute naturally leads to a con-
sideration of the question of what, after all, is an occupational
disease.
Disease Resulting from. a Definite Traumam. In considering
this phase of the subject, we are at the outset met with the
question of what is the position of a disease which, instead of
coming on gradually as a result of working conditions, has
grown out of a definite trauma. One who suffers a fall may
develop pneumonia under such circumstances that the causal
connection may be established. Under conditions the result of
which may be more debatable we may have a case of frost-
bite and a resultant erysipelas. A definite accident may cause
a nephritis or a pneumonia. The question occurs, therefore,
as to whether we are dealing with an occupational disease proper,
or simply with a sequela of a definite trauma. Whether by
express provision of statute, or whether by construction of law,
the conclusion is generally reached that these results do not
18 The schedules sometimes not only set out the specific diseases, but
indicate the processes, thus further limiting the scope of the law. Thus
in Ohio, the schedule begins-
"Description of disease Description of process,
or injury,
1. Anthrax Handling of wool, hair, bristles,
hides and sdn.
2. Glanders Care of any equine animal suffering
from glanders; handling carcass of
such animal."
This restriction in that state is, however, of very limited effect, as the
remainder of the schedule is illustrated by the next item;
"3. Lead poisoning Any industrial process involving the
use of lead or its preparation or its
compounds."
Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1921) § 1465-68a.
537
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represent occupational disease, but conditions which are com-
pensable even though the compensation system is confined to
accident and does not extend to occupational disease in the ab-
stract. This result, that a disease growing out of a definite
trauma is compensable, is generally reached as a matter of con-
struction. In many of the statutes, however, the principle has
been expressly incorporated. 9
Occupational Diseases in Their Nature Like Other Diseases.
Of occupational diseases, it is to be remembered all the time
that they do not differ essentially from diseases of a different
origin. As said by Dr. W. Gilmore Thompson in the pioneer
work on the subject in this country: 20 "Occupational diseases
are not new diseases from the ultimate pathological standpoint."
The author illustrates by noting that the arterio-sclerosis or
chronic nephritis produced by lead poisoning does not differ
from that condition when induced by alcoholism or other toxic
,causes and he further instances the case of bone necrosis from
phosphorous poisoning which is said not to differ from necroses
of other origin. Probably no disease exclusively of occupational
origin exists. In the vast majority of cases lead poisoning is
of occupational origin, but obviously it can be contracted in
one's home as well as in a factory provided the conditions are
there. Even the more obscure and unusual diseases which
arrest the attention in the schedules of the occupational diseases
act, such as anthrax, could obviously be contracted outside of
industry.
The difference between the diseases which ordinarily present
themselves to the mind as occupational, and those which make
another impression, is that the former are in a sense charac-
teristic of industry and ordinarily met with as a consequence
of industry, while the latter are commonly of non-occupational
origin. The distinction is not exact, but is employed for a
thoroughly practical purpose in the way of attempting in the
great majority of cases to charge against industry only those
results which it should bear.
Diseases Compensable Because in Turn Causedi by Compen-
sable Diseases. The disease may be compensable because it is
in itself such a disease as is directly covered by the statute,
whatever the form of that statute may be. On the other hand,
it may owe its compensability to its relation to another disease.
Thus there may be a disease which, if it stood by itself, would
not be compensable, for which compensation may nevertheless
19 For instance, in Maryland, the statute defines injury as inclusive of
"'such disease or infection as may naturally result therefrom." Md. Code
(Bagby, 1924) Art. 101, § 65.
20 THOMPSON, OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES (1914) 48, 49.
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be granted on the ground that it is a sequela of compensable
disease. No better illustration of this can be found than that
arising under the statute until recently in force in Connecticut
which denied compensation for a disease of a communicable
nature. It would be universally admitted that tuberculosis is com-
municable. It would seem that tuberculosis growing out of in-
dust-T and preceded by no other disease would be, under a stat-
ute of the nature to which reference has just been made, non-
compensable. If, however, the tuberculosis is simply a result of
the disease called pneumoconiosis-a fibrotic condition of the
lungs caused by inhaling metallic or mineral particles-compen-
sation may be granted for incapacity or death due to it.=z
There are several things which cause complications when the
principle of workmen's compensation is extended to occupational
disease. Only under rare circumstances does compensation
for an accident affect two employers; commonly an occupational
disease grows out of more than one employment. In general
terms it may be said that an attempt-often a very rough one-
is made to charge up against each employer the results in the
way of occupational disease of what happens in his own under-
taking. These results may manifest themselves either during the
time of the employment with a particular employer, or after
the service has ceased. That in itself is an immaterial element.
Sometimes this division of responsibility results from the use
of mere general language but in some of the statutes there are
express provisions determining the respective liabilities.
It has generally been deemed impracticable by the legislators
to cover a period longer than a few years, although theoreti-
cally results should be recognized as long as they can be traced
back to causes. The obvious difficulty is as time goes on to
determine what are the results of industrial causes and what are
the results of that which has no legitimate connection with the
industry. To weigh accurately the responsibility of each em-
ployer is beyond human power. The statute law often contents
itself with a proportion based upon the periods of service; often,
on the other hand,-and this is most apt to be the case when
the statute is couched in general terms-other elements are
taken into account, such as the hours of labor, the varying
degrees of exposures and the different hazards incident to the
exposures. Where this is done the division is less frankly
23-Kovalisi v. Collins Co., 102 Conn. 6, 11, 128 Atl. 288, 290 (1923),
where it is said: "But in this case, the injury which developed with grind-
er's consumption was a weakened resistance to infection called pneumo-
coniosis. This was an injury not contagious or communicable." That
pneumoconiosis is itself a disease seems to be assumed. Dombrowski v.
Jennings & Griffin Co., 103 Conn. 720, 727, 131 Atl. 745, '748 (1925).
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arbitrary, but much more subject to the uncertainties incident
to the exercise of human judgment.
The results of accident do not generally become intermingled
and confused with the results of causes with which the em-
ployer has no concern; intermingling and confusion are common
complications in an attempt to award compensation for occupa-
tional disease. As said by Professor Thompson in the work
already cited :22
"It may be claimed that the workman is the victim of chronic
lead poisoning; but are his arterio-sclerosis and nephritis due
exclusively to lead poisoning, or are alcohol, syphilis or gout
the underlying causes? Is his neuritis due to arsenic or alcohol?
* * * * Was he turberculous before he undertook work in a
pottery, or did his work contribute to the disease? Are his
chronic bronchitis, anemia and malnutrition due to chronic gas
poisoning acquired as a garment presser, or are they due to
defective hygiene at home, poor food, lack of exercise, and the
strain and anxibties of poverty? Such are the types of questions
which constantly arise in connection with occupational diseases."
Obviously, however, we are dealing only with questions of
degree. The same intermingling, with the same resulting con-
fusion and uncertainty, may exist in accident as in disease.
The difference is that in the one case it is comparatively un-
common and in the other so common that it may be said to be
almost generally present.
It is easy in the vast majority of cases to distinguish between
an accident in industry and one which has arisen out of ordinary
living; in occupational diseases the difficulty of making this
distinction is at the maximum. Naturally, the broader the scope
of the compensation for occupational diseases the greater is the
difficulty of determining what in a particular instance is an
occupational disease and what is not. One would hardly get
pneumoconiosis at home and would probably run but a small
chance of coming down with lead poisoning. If, on the other
hand, tuberculosis is included among occupational diseases the
difficulty of making the distinction becomes acute. In all of
these questions appearances are apt to be deceptive. It is
the view of many physicians who have given attention to this
subject, for instance, that one of the safest employments so
far as tuberculosis is concerned is that of an, attendant in a
sanatorium for the tubercular.
Speaking broadly, the compensation acts are inclined to dis-
regard the particular kind of employment and the particular
kind of accident. It is to be remembered here, however, that in
many jurisdictions a distinction is made between hazardous and
22 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 20, at xxiv.
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non-hazardous employments in granting compensation for results
of accident. This same distinction often inheres in statutes
covering occupational diseases, and the different industries are
sometimes classified by schedules, the compensation for certain
diseases being restricted to certain lines of work.
Where there are different employments and the employee is
sick as a result partly of one and partly of the other, there are
two methods observed by statutes, as those statutes are con-
strued, of approaching the problem as to the liability of each.
The disease may be treated as an entity in the first instance
and the effort then made to weigh responsibilities for it. It
may on the other hand be viewed as a disease caused by the
first employment and aggravated by subsequent employments,
the first employer being responsible for what the results would
have been had the employee stopped work, and the subsequent
employers being responsible for aggravations.
There is no reason in the nature of things why an employer
whose work aggravates that which a previous employment has
begun should be in any different situation than one whose woork
aggravates that which has been begun outside of employment.
Where, however, the principle of compensation for aggravation
has come in as a part of an occupational disease system, the
view has been taken that the responsibility of the employer is
limited to aggravation only where the disease originated in
employment, and that where the disease originated out of em-
ployment the unfortunate employer must foot the whole bill.?
In accident, medical testimony, while it plays a very large
part, may be important only in determining the amount of com-
pensation; the very right to get compensation for occupational
disease at all will probably rest upon what the doctors say.
The way in which the medical man functions in the administra-
tion of compensation acts varies greatly. In some states no
physician has an official standing. He is like any other wit-
ness called by one side or the other, and the weight given to
his testimony is determined by the same considerations as the
weight which would be given to him as a witness in a law
suit at common law. In other states, there is contemplated the
appointment of a physician or physicians who are definitely
public officers. Often their findings determine in the first in-
stance the medical aspects of the case. If disputed, however,
other medical testimony is heard. In a general way, there is
a legislative tendency in the determination of compensation for
occupational diseases to create a more definite medical machinery
than in the case of compensation for accident. The same gen-
23 Bongialatte v. Wales-Lines Co., 97 Conn. 548, 117 AtI. 69G (1922).
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eralizations, however, may be made in the one case as in the
other.
SOME THOUGHTS ON AN IDEAL OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
COMPENSATION ACT
The experience of the states in the last decade suggests cer-
tain characteristics of a proper occupational diseases act.
First: It should be simple in its framework and should be
coordinated with the parent legislation. If changes are made
in one, corresponding changes should be made in the other when
necessary to the existence of a consistent whole. The admini-
stration should be confided to the same officers or to the same
board.
In other words there should be in effect one system growing
out of the same social need, involving intrinsically the same
problems and calling for the same relief. Special provisions
may be necessary in the effort to compensate for the one kind
of industrial waste, which are not needed in the same form in
attempting to compensate for the other. On analysis, and
further experience, however, the necessity for varying provi-
sions tends to fade away. In some jurisdictions now the two
problems are worked out as one.
Second: We can not forget the weaknesses of human nature
and the proneness of human beings to attempt to escape effort. We
can not lose sight of the fact that justice must hold even scales
between those who pay and those who are to receive. We must
seek to avoid temporary injustices during the period of ad-
justment. We must do everything possible to protct the em-
ployer from real malingering and a sort unintentional quasi-
malingering.
Third: Preserving all these cautions, the real object must be
kept steadfastly in mind and a serious attempt made to place
the workman in the same position, so far as the case admits,
as though he had remained well and sound. This involves the
allowance by way of compensation of as large a percentage of
the wage as is possible and its payment, in so far as may be,
for the full period of incapacity, with a compensation period
in case of death sufficient to make good to his dependents the
financial loss which they have sustained. No system of law ever
afforded full redress. There must always be a yielding to practi-
cal exigency. Money can never make good the most serious
losses. The necessity for some sort of demonstration or some-
thing approaching demonstration may cause recovery to fall far
short of full relief. To this general limitation a compensation
law can afford no exceptions. As a counsel of perfection per-
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haps it should be borne in mind that the relief should be as
adequate as it can be.
Fourth: The provisions as to medical aid should be fair and
liberal. The earlier workmen's compensation legislation gener-
ally allowed medical assistance which could hardly be dignified
with a higher name than "first aid." The movement has been all
in favor of an extension of this period. In Connecticut full medi-
cal aid is now allowed and this is construed to mean such medical
assistance as the circumstances call for, whatever its expense
and wherever it is obtainable. This gives a broad commission to
the administrator and it is of course assumed that the law will
be administered with common sense.
Such liberality is obviously in the interest not only of the
employee but of the employer as well, in that it tends to de-
crease the compensation and is in the interest likewise of the
general public. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act there
is now expended in Connecticut substantially the same amount
for medical aid as for compensation itself. Wherever practicable,
the worker should be restored to the ranks of industry rather
than given a place upon a pension list.
One of the surprising and gratifying incidents in the
administration of workmen's compensation of all kinds has been
that the cure of the injured and diseased has enlisted the aid
of medical men of high standing. The cheap and incompetent
doctor has by no means been eliminated, but he has not been
much in evidence. The employers, who have in one way or
another paid the bills, have early found that the best is the
cheapest and have turned, in the vast majority of cases, to physi-
cians of standing, whether actuated by the highest motives or
merely by economy. Where the oversight of medical treatment
is, as it generally is in one form or another, in the control of
those administering the act, it has proven that the authority
thus confided is seldom to be exercised. The importance of
the physician in this connection will always be great. Where
it is deemed necessary to so commission a certain physician or
body of physicians that their findings constitute prima facic the
medical facts, there should be the fullest opportunity to weigh
those findings, with every right of cross-examination preserved
and every opportunity to present differing views through expert
witnesses.
Fifth: The law should be so framed as to do justice to the
employer by protecting him from illnesses which his operations
have neither caused nor aggravated. He should receive this
protection whether the other. inducing causes arose out of an-
other employment, or from non-occupational causes. He should
be guarded against the natural tendency of mankind to either
intentionally or unintentionally get something for nothing.
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The workman should likewise be protected against himself
by properly encouraging him to make reasonable efforts to the
end that he may retain his ambition and self respect, and that
the psychic effects of what has happened to him may be minim-
ized. Here the interests of the workman, the employer and
society are one. In this way each industry will pay its part.
Sixth: The law should go so far as it can to measure the
responsibility of each employment without landing in a maze of
guess-work, complication and uncertainty. In fixing the period
of compensation the law should look ahead, so far as is practica-
ble, but stop short of the twilight zone where, owing to the
existence of other elements, it is impossible to trace cause
and effect.
LOOKING AHEAD
After all, while compensation for accident is now made in
the majority of the American states, the compensation of oc-
cupational diseases is in its infancy, and clean-cut provisions
of any general applicability exist as yet in only about a third
of the states. In others the system is fragmentary and does
not yield itself readily to statistical efforts. What has been
done in the past is interesting mainly, as an index of what may
be expected in the future. If the principle of compensation
be "sound, and no doubt is now entertained on that head, it
must be that the development of this branch of the system is
sound also. To an increasing extent industry will stand behind
the results of occupation when those results are expressed in
terms of disease.
Differences, although tending gradually to disappear, will re-
main in the scope of the relief afforded, in the procedure and
in a hundred details. It may be confidently asserted, however,
that the law will move forward and not backward.
Upon the points suggested as the characteristics of an ideal
law there will be found, so long as they are siated abstractly,
something approaching a unanimity of opinion. They are in
a way being worked out with much variation in detail in the
acts now upon the statute book, with a development in the
direction of unformity. Legislation along any line is apt to be
a compromise, and this is particularly true of that involving
the relations of different elements in our society.
The whole conception of compensation for disease independ-
ently of fault is comparatively new. The legislation is often
crude. The construction represents the attempt of courts to deal
with new legal conceptions. We are far from having heard the
last word. We are surely on the way, however, toward real jus-
tice and high social ideals.
